A study on the ethical structure of Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna: a critique of the consequentialist approach by Song, Jinsub
 
 
 
 
 
A STUDY ON THE ETHICAL STRUCTURE OF AWAKENING OF FAITH IN 
THE MAHĀYĀNA 
: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSEQUENTIALIST APPROACH 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
JINSUB SONG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THESIS 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Arts in East Asian Studies 
in the Graduate College of the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
 
 
 Adviser: 
 
  Professor Alexander Mayer 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
Abstract 
 In this thesis, I refute the consequentialist approach to Chinese Buddhism. This approach 
to Buddhist ethics has been popularized by scholars such as Charles Goodman in the last two 
decades. In a sense, they try to establish a systematic Buddhist ethical theory that can be applied 
to our daily lives. However, the consequentialist approach is very problematic in that it fails to 
incorporate important ontological concepts of Buddhism regarding a sentient being's mind. In 
addition, this approach has some radical arguments, such as justifying harming others, which can 
be hardly accepted by a common understanding of Buddhism. 
 In order to dispute consequentialist approach, I mainly examine the Awakening of Faith 
in the Mahāyāna (大乘起信論, = the Awakening), the most important treatise in Chinese Buddhist 
history. Many Chinese Buddhist scholars consider this treatise to be crucial because it provides a 
thorough explanation of the mind. Using the Awakening, I will discuss concepts about the mind 
in an exploration of the theoretical structure of Chinese Buddhist ethics. By doing so, I will show 
why the consequentialist approach is problematic. I will argue that Chinese Buddhist ethics 
around the Awakening is more similar to deontology, and that the consequentialist approach is 
only plausible based on narrow interpretations of the Awakening.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Once established, schools of interpretation can easily extend their interpretational 
territory into peripheral areas surrounding their original target. Cases in which hegemonic 
schools of thought have generated wasteful debates are aplenty across fields of study. And 
though these debates may have contributed to the quantity of human ideas, and may have even 
provided foundations for creative thinking, these potential advantages do not justify the 
establishment of a misleading framework of thought. It is hard to deny that misleading schools of 
thought have impeded the development of proper discourse. I believe that any misunderstandings 
that have been generated through such problematic schools should be rectified as soon as 
possible in order to prevent their further diffusion. The consequentialist approach to Buddhist 
ethics, which has been established recently in Western and Eastern academia, is one of the 
misunderstandings. 
 This thesis is prepared for two major purposes. The first one is to critique the 
consequentialist approach to Buddhist ethics. For this critique, I will mainly refer to the 
Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna (大乘起信論, = the Awakening), one of the most important 
treatises in the Chinese Buddhist history. This treatise was composed by Asvaghosa (馬鳴) and 
translated into Chinese by Paramārtha (眞諦, 499~569)1 who came to China during the Liang (梁) 
dynasty from Ujjayanī of Western India. From its compilation, its ontological idea of the 
 
1 Two different translated version of the Awakening are extant, but there is no original Sanscrit version of this 
treatise. The other translated version was composed by Sikasananda (實叉難陀, 652~710). Since many later 
Buddhist scholars worked based on Paramārtha’s translation, I chose his translation as a main object of this paper.  
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tathāgata-garbha (如來藏) has affected the thought of various sinicized Buddhist schools like 
Shelun (攝論), Huayan (華嚴), Tiantai (天台), and Chan (禪).2 Thus, I will limit my focus on the 
schools that share the idea of tathāgata-garbha. This means that I will not discuss applications of 
consequentialism to other branches of Buddhist tradition.  
The second purpose is to provide more appropriate interpretations of various aspects of 
Chinese Buddhist ethics. This thesis will shed light on important aspects of Buddhism omitted by 
the consequentialist approach, and seek how to incorporate them into a revised single ethical 
system. I believe that the aspects omitted are the most important components in Buddhist ethical 
theory. So I intend to present an ethical model different from that proposed by the 
consequentialist perspective. Since the Awakening provides a detailed explanation of the aspects 
that the consequentialist omitted, studying this treatise will be the best choice. 
 This thesis comprises of three main chapters based on the purposes described above. In 
the first chapter, I will examine the logic of ethical consequentialism. The recent consequentialist 
approaches to Buddhist ethics and their characteristics will also be discussed here. In the second 
chapter, fundamental notions in the Awakening, like Suchness (眞如) and the five ways of 
practice (修行五門), will be examined in detail. In the last chapter, a critique of the 
consequentialist approach will be presented based on the ethical aspects of the Awakening. The 
issue of the moral evaluation in both traditions will be mainly discussed. In the third chapter, I 
will show why the consequentialist approach cannot properly apprehend Chinese Buddhist ethics 
 
2 According to Gyoo-tag Shin, there are other sutras, which share the idea of tathāgata-garbha, such as Avatamsaka 
Sutra (華嚴經), Shurangama Sutra (楞嚴經), or Diamond Sutra (金剛經). These sutras also affected the formation of 
Chinese Buddhist schools. Cf. Gyoo-tag Shin, "The Thought of Pure Land (淨土) from the Perspective of the School 
of Fa-Xing (法性宗)," Studies of Pure Land Buddhism (淨土學硏究) Vol.13, 2010, 57~58. 
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and suggest an alternative interpretation of the ethical theory of the Awakening. In this chapter, I 
will refer to the Commentary on the Awakening (大乘起信論義記), one of the major three 
commentaries on the Awakening. This commentary by Fazang (法藏, 643~712), who was the 
third Chinese Huayan master, is traditionally considered required reading in studying the 
Awakening. Its detailed and clear exposition supplements the Awakening’s terseness. In the 
second and third chapters, I will also refer to the translations written by Yoshito Hakeda and 
Jongsik Jeon in citing the original texts of the Awakening and Fazang's commentary.3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Cf. Yoshito S. Hakeda, The Awakening of Faith, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006; Jongsik Jeon, 
Comparative Work of the Commentaries on the Awakening written by Wonhyo and Fazang, Seoul: Yehak, 2006.  
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CHAPTER ONE: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONSEQUENTIALIST 
APPROACH TO BUDDHISM 
 
Rectifying misunderstandings is a common feature in Chinese Buddhist studies. It is 
currently also one of the most important activities in the field of Buddhist ethics because many 
interpretations are continuously established to explain the same, or at least, similar ideas. I want 
to analyze how the many dominant interpretations of Buddhist ethics are informed by Western 
ethical models functioning as methodological tools of analysis. Firstly, it is at some level natural 
that Western scholars’ treatments of Buddhist ethics would be informed by their culturally-
specific ethical theories, especially when Buddhist ethics were incorporated into their general 
discourses on ethics. We see this mostly in translations that interpret Buddhist concepts through 
pre-existing ethical concepts. For example, the Buddhist concept of Dabeixin (大悲心) is 
commonly translated as “great compassion,” as this phrase is accessible to the Western 
discourses of ethics. Therefore, this translated phrase is understood as a major part of Buddhist 
ethics, despite some nuance of the concept being lost. Nonetheless, culturally different 
knowledge about ethical theories is productive at some level when studying Buddhist ethics. 
Indeed, much research on it has been conducted as comparative studies.  
Secondly, it is convenient to overlay a single system over the diversity of Buddhist 
theory to aid interpretation. Historically, Buddhism has been affected by Indian thought and 
religions when it was established. It also continuously developed its doctrines in various areas as 
time went on. Thus, Buddhism is too doctrinally complex for a single theory. This difficulty is 
not even resolved when the field is limited to a specific region and topic, such as Chinese 
Buddhist ethics. In this regard, approaching Buddhist doctrine from the perspective of existing 
ethical theories is an apparently attractive option. But this method of studying Buddhist ethics 
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easily generates a tendency to understand Buddhist theory as a part of existing ethical theories. 
This assumption also implies that Buddhist theory can be fully grasped just by these existing 
theories, although this illusion is only due to some overlaps or similarities. Such a tendency is 
highly likely to distort or just bury the multifarious aspects of Buddhist doctrine by treating them 
as unnecessary components. 
Understanding Buddhist ethics as a sort of consequentialism is one of the examples of 
this tendency. Even though it is helpful in apprehending the partial meaning of some Buddhist 
ideas, the consequentialist approach fails to incorporate many theoretical aspects in Buddhism. 
This approach makes problematic judgements about Buddhist ethics while disregarding 
important concepts of Buddhist doctrine. I will start my discussion from examining this process.  
 The word “consequentialism,” created by Anscombe,4 has been used to label a certain 
type of theoretical tendency that exclusively sticks to consequences to assess acts. It is defined as 
… the view that normative properties depend only on consequences. (……) The most prominent 
example is consequentialism about the moral rightness of acts, which holds that whether an act is 
morally right depends only on the consequences of that act or of something related to that act, such as 
the motive behind the act or a general rule requiring acts of the same kind.5 
 
For instance, when doing harm to others is discouraged by consequentialism, this is only because 
it may cause negative consequences like a pain that outweighs the pleasure that they feel. 
Violation of others' rights or social rules6 are not relevant matters. This implies that some 
extreme acts, like killing others, which is absolutely prohibited from other ethical viewpoints, 
can be morally permitted if it is expected to generate good consequences. While there are various 
 
4 In the article prepared to dispute utilitarianism, she argues that this word is created in order to mark some 
utilitarian philosophers like Henry Sidgwick. Cf. G. E. M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy", Philosophy 33, 
No.124, 1958, 10. 
5 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, "Consequentialism", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2015.  
URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/. 
6 These are considered only when they are counted as a part of consequences. 
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offshoots of consequentialist theories, I am going to examine act-consequentialism and its 
relationship to morality.7  
 Before the word "consequentialism" was formulated and started to be widely used, 
"utilitarianism" had been commonly used to indicate the same line of thought. In many contexts, 
therefore, utilitarianism is still considered to be the essence of consequentialism, and is 
sometimes considered to be interchangeable with it. Some classic utilitarians, such as Jeremy 
Bentham and John Stuart Mill, are regarded as major figures who established the basis of 
consequentialism.  
 As is well known, Bentham was the moral ethicist who paved the road for the 
development of utilitarianism. In his famous book, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals 
and Legislation, he starts his discussion by declaring utilitarian logic as follows: 
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is 
for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one 
hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to 
their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think. (……) The principle of utility 
recognizes this subjection, and assume it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to 
rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. (……) By utility is meant that property in 
any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in 
present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the 
happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the part whose interest is considered.8 
 
According to him, the balance between pain and pleasure, which he addresses as utility, is the 
only standard in determining what is morally right, and what we ought to do. That is, increasing 
the sum of pleasure, minus the total amount of pain, is the only method required. And all men, by 
 
7 Act consequentialism is defined as "the claim that an act is morally right if and only if that act maximizes the 
good, that is, if and only if the total amount of good for all minus the total amount of bad for all is greater than this 
net amount for any incompatible act available to the agent on that occasion." Cf. Ibid.  
URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/. 
8 Jeremy Bentham, An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation, Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2000, 
14~15. 
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their nature, calculate their own amounts of pleasure and pain.9 This was his fundamental 
assumption and he suggested a detailed method to measure the balance of them.10 Hence, the 
only standard to assess human acts is their consequences. Since desirable consequences are 
condensed into a single object, that is, sensory happiness or pleasure, his utilitarian theory has 
been also called quantitative hedonism or quantitative utilitarianism. Namely, this theory 
assumes that every type of consequence can be measured by means of the tools, pleasure and 
pain, and further can be expressed as a sum total. This implies that moral values of each act 
depend on their consequences and they can be compared to one another and one can be chosen as 
the best.  
 Setting up a single standard was an effective way to establish his theory clearly, but at 
the same time, it generated lots of counter-claims against Bentham. Many refutations were 
closely related to questions about the quality of pleasure. And these affected the establishment of 
Mill's utilitarian idea. The main point of Mill's texts, such as Utilitarianism, was to answer 
critiques of consequentialism and make utilitarian theory clearer, while Bentham's writings were 
supposed to prepare the fundamental ground of utilitarian theory.11 The unification of moral 
values, suggested by Bentham, was problematic in some important aspects indeed. For example, 
it caused human beings and other animals to be bound by the same moral principle since physical 
pleasure was not a unique feature of humans.12 In addition to that, the more intricate problem 
 
9 Ibid., 146. 
10 Ibid., 31~34. 
11 Youngjung Kim, Wongyu Jung, "Mill's Utilitarianism", Journal of Philosophical Ideas Separate Vol.2-9, Institute 
of Philosophy of Seoul National University, 2003, 7. 
12 Mill says: "For it the sources of pleasure were precisely the same to human beings and to swine, the rule of life 
which is good enough for the one would be good enough for the other." Cf. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism and On 
Liberty, edited by Mary Warnock, Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2003, 186. 
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was that some acts, which seem to be immoral, can be justified by his theory as a means of 
obtaining pleasure. Sadistic pleasure, for instance, can be considered as one of consequences, 
and further pursuing it can be morally justified by the fact that the total amount of this pleasure 
exceeds the amount of pain that sadistic acts may generate. Thus, this sadism can be justified 
even in the case that a sadist harms others for the purpose of his pathological pleasure. Mill's 
idea to solve such problems was to grade the qualities of pleasures and assign different moral 
values to each act. He states: 
Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious 
of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification. (……) There 
is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the 
feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those 
of mere sensation. It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writers in general have placed the 
superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, 
&c., of the former. (……) It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact, that 
some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others.13 
 
Thus, Mill discriminated between different qualities of pleasure. Qualitatively superior pleasures 
and acts which cause those pleasures, must be considered as more morally important than others. 
Mill counted various mental or spiritual pleasures, which belong neither to immoral acts nor 
animal behaviors, in the list of the relatively superior pleasure. This is actually the reason why 
his utilitarianism is sometimes called qualitative hedonism or qualitative utilitarianism. 
Meanwhile, he provided a method to discern which pleasures are superior to others. This method 
is to find which pleasure an individual would prefer among a set of target pleasures, given that 
the individual had experienced all of them.14 However, this was still a little naive because 
differences in personal backgrounds, which may affect individual preferences and choices, 
 
13 Ibid., 187. 
14 Ibid., 187. 
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would not be considered in establishing his graded structure of pleasure. That is to say, different 
individuals, who have different backgrounds, would assess the same set of pleasures differently. 
This problem, in practice, causes huge trouble in using Mill's moral principle. Mill's answer to 
the existing critiques of utilitarianism was seemingly successful. In practice, however, he left 
space for another type of critique. 
 Examining these critiques of utilitarianism is not the purpose of this thesis. However, the 
utilitarians' reactions to the critiques actually seem to show two very important implications. On 
the one hand, they tried to assess the rightness of human acts by means of measuring the total 
amount of pleasure resulting from them. However, it is not the case that all of them valued every 
type of pleasure equally. Some of them, such as Mill, tried to grade pleasures based on their 
qualities, and designate some mental or spiritual pleasures as superior to others. Indeed, 
consequentialism is not solely concerned with physical pleasures. The area of pleasures for 
consequentialism can be extended to conceptual objects which offer mental or spiritual happiness 
to an agent. In fact, utilitarians attempt to unify various different purposes of acts into a single 
one which is called pleasure. However, they then multiplied these pleasures again. This 
characteristic of utilitarianism actually allows a broad interpretation of the concept of good 
consequences. For example, some non-physical objects such as knowledge, fine character, a 
sense of morality, and social regulation and rules can be related to the pleasure or happiness of 
an agent as consequences. In this regard, there is room for some moral theories which pursue 
these objects to be counted as variations of consequentialism.15 On the other hand, the logic of 
 
15 It is still arguable, but Mill insists that even virtues are desirable only for the purpose of earning pleasure or 
happiness. It seems that he considers the happiness achieved by virtues to be a kind of optional consequences. Ibid., 
213. 
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consequentialism, which is derived from utilitarianism, has a close relation to a principle of 
justifying an agent's acts. In this logic, acts that pursue the best or relatively better consequences 
are justified by their results. That is, moral acts here are assessed only by the consequences they 
have caused or may cause in the near future. This logic actually implies that there is no 
assumption about a certain fixed set of right acts. In consequentialism, therefore, some acts 
which may cause positive consequences in specific circumstances would be considered to be 
morally good, and the same acts which generate negative consequences under different 
circumstances would be inversely assessed. There is no act which has an inherent moral quality 
within it.16 
 In the consequentialist logic, therefore, if an act is said to be morally encouraged, it 
merely means that the act has already caused, or is expected to cause the best consequence in the 
specific circumstances. This is one of the perspectives that has been utilized in the discussion of 
Buddhist thought in the field of ethics. In contemporary academia, in fact, it is not hard to find 
scholars who consider Buddhism as a sort of ethical consequentialism. Barbra Clayton, Charles 
Goodman, and Namkyul Hur are representative of such a perspective. Here I am going to 
examine the consequentialist approach suggested by Goodman to find what aspects it includes 
and how we can deal with it in the Chinese Buddhist context. 
 Goodman's approach has three major aspects. The first aspect, which clearly shows the 
theoretical characteristics of consequentialism, is the fundamental ground of his ideas. He argues 
that some consequentialist theories admit the existence of objective and intrinsic forms of 
 
16 Damien Keown, who understands Buddhism as a sort of virtue ethics, also points out this aspect. He declares: 
"For consequentialism, nothing has inherent value other than the utility produced." Cf. Damien Keown, "Karma, 
Character, and Consequentialism", Journal of Religious Ethics Vol.24, 1996, 346. 
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goodness, like happiness and virtues. These theories are categorized as character 
consequentialism.17 According to him, Buddhist ideals like achieving enlightenment and 
salvaging sentient beings can be considered as good consequences in this perspective. He states: 
But at its core, the theory of character consequentialism involves taking virtues to be intrinsically 
valuable―that is, adding them to the objective list of intrinsic goods―and then maximizing the good 
thus defined. (……) Given the particular theory of well-being I have attributed to Buddhists, when 
they discuss the motives behind actions, they may be as interested in what acting out of a particular 
motive does to your psyche as in what it reveals about your psyche. Buddhists should agree with 
Aristotle that, over time, habitual actions can shape your character, for good or bad. Since, as I have 
claimed, Buddhists consider character traits to be intrinsically morally important, they will regard 
effects on character as among the more important consequences of many of our actions. Insofar as 
similar actions performed out of different motives have different effects on character, they have 
different consequences.18 
  
Since Goodman defines his main idea as character consequentialism,19 I believe that it is not 
problematic to see the above citation as his understanding of Buddhist ethics. It seems that this 
explanation modifies existing consequentialist theory a lot by assuming goodness as inherent and 
objective. However, this is actually no more than a specific example of the first implication of 
the consequentialist logic derived from classic utilitarian theories. As a matter of fact, 
consequentialism has acknowledged the existence of inherent goodness since the advent of 
utilitarianism. It was nothing but pleasure. As discussed, this singular tool for measuring 
consequences was actually multiplied after Mill broadened the conceptual area of pleasure by 
proposing a qualitative hedonism. Some mental or spiritual happiness had already been 
considered as a desirable consequence in the tradition of consequentialism. By adding some 
detailed explanations to that, Goodman just imputed Buddhist ideal characteristics to the forms 
 
17 Charles Goodman, Consequences and Compassion: An Interpretation and Defense of Buddhist Ethics, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009, 24. 
18 Ibid., 206~208. 
19 Ibid., 43. 
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of inherent goodness. Hence, the inner logic of consequentialism is still valid here. That is to say, 
pursuing the best or better consequences is assessed to be morally right. If some Buddhist 
characteristics have intrinsic goodness, as Goodman describes, any act to achieve them must be 
considered to be morally right since it will lead to good consequences. On the other hand, his 
character consequentialism is also compatible with the second implication of the consequentialist 
logic. Namely, the proposition that there is no act which has an inherent moral value in itself is 
still valid because the morally important thing is not an act per se, but achieving the ideal 
characteristics which are inherently good. Some acts pursue the ideal characteristics function as a 
means to achieve goodness. However, these are still considered not to have their own moral 
value. There is no necessary causal relationship between goodness and some acts which lead to 
achieving it.  
This feature provides a theoretical foundation for the second aspect of Goodman's 
character consequentialist approach. According to him, some Buddhist precepts, which are 
supposed to be practiced, can be violated for the purpose of achieving the best consequence. He 
refers to the story of King Anala from the Avataṃsaka Sūtra: 
When Sudhana arrives in the city, he discovers that the king is surrounded by frightening, wrathful 
demons who are constantly engaged in meting out severe punishments to those who violate the city's 
laws. (……) But King Anala reveals to him that both the wrathful guardians and their criminal 
victims are actually illusions created by Anala's magical powers. As a result of the punishments 
meted out to these wholly illusory malefactors, the real citizens are terrified into acting rightly. 
(……) One of the things he is trying to bring about in deceiving his people is virtue. He is prepared to 
tell lies―thereby, perhaps, impairing his own virtue―in order to bring about a much greater total 
amount of virtue among the populace, including the virtue of not telling lies. (……) This idea ―that 
rules such as "Don't tell lies" are merely rules of thumb, which can be broken when breaking them 
would have good consequences―may itself be an indication of a consequentialist moral perspective. 
We have some reason, it seems, to interpret King Anala as a (perhaps tacit) character 
consequentialist.20  
 
 
20 Ibid., 92~93. 
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According to Goodman, it is obvious that King Anala broke the precept by deceiving his people. 
But his deceptive act could be justified by the context of the Avataṃsaka Sūtra because he could 
achieve the greater good by sacrificing his own virtue. Indeed, because of his sacrifice the people 
could have more stable circumstances to keep and cultivate their own virtues. It seems that here 
Goodman is deriving the proposition that Buddhist precepts can be broken in specific 
circumstances from the perspective of universal consequentialism.21 According to this 
perspective, total goodness as consequence must be calculated agent-neutrally. Hence personal 
losses of the agent really do not matter in the calculation of consequences. It means that an 
agent's personal goodness can be ignored if it is a matter to achieve someone else's goodness, 
that is, if it will obviously lead to better consequences.22 Therefore, an agent must be ready to 
bear his loss whenever he can achieve the best net goodness for others as, King Anala did.  
The third aspect of Goodman's position is that the exact target of moral assessment here is 
not an act which actually generates the best consequences, but intention to achieve those 
consequences. In this regard, his consequentialism is classified as subjective consequentialism or 
subjective utilitarianism. He describes: 
Although objective utilitarians think that acts that appeared to be right could later turn out to have 
been wrong, since they happened to have bad consequences, subjective utilitarians, like Buddhists, 
would hold that if you do what you expect to have the best consequences on the whole, your action is 
morally right, no matter what its actual consequences are. (……) Thus, for instance, Channa, who 
donated the food to the Buddha that gave him dysentery and thereby caused his death, was acting 
rightly, according to the Buddhist scriptures, because he did not know that the food was 
contaminated. (……) A subjective utilitarian could praise Channa for acting rightly, since he thought 
his action would have the good consequences of sustaining the Budda's life and making merit for 
 
21 Goodman describes elsewhere that he understands Mahāyāna ethics as universal consequentialism. Cf. Charles 
Goodman, "Consequentialism, Agent-neutrality, and Mahāyāna Ethics", Journal of Buddhist Ethics Vol.20, 2003, 
614. 
22 Goodman explains the fundamental feature of universal consequentilaism as follows: "One of my actions can be 
right even though it is harmful to my flourishing, so long as its consequences are sufficiently beneficial to others, 
including others who are in no important way related to me. (……) The value of generous acts derives from the 
benefits they confer on all those involved: the contributions to the welfare of both the giver and the recipient matter, 
and matter equally, in deciding the value of the action." Ibid., 617. 
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himself.23 
 
As we can see in the case of Channa, the moral assessment of an act is based on the actor's 
intention. If the agent had the intention to achieve the best consequence for others and himself, 
his action must be regarded as right no matter what consequences eventually accrued. I believe 
that such a perspective is inevitable for consequentialists, because objective consequentialism, 
which assesses the moral value of an action solely based on its actual consequence, cannot guide 
an action in practice. Guiding good actions is properly workable only when the guidance is 
offered in advance of the action. In the case of objective consequentialism, however, assessing 
the moral value of an act is only possible after the act has already transpired and lead to 
consequences. Hence, this type of consequentialism cannot guide an agent to necessarily do a 
good action. Whenever it tries to function as action guidance, it must include intention and 
expectation of an act, which has not been practiced yet, as a standard for the moral assessment. 
This fact implies that it must also include the possibility that the actual consequences of an act 
can differ from the original intention. Eventually, therefore, his logic leads to a subjective 
consequentialism. That is, it is inevitable to expect possible consequences beforehand in order to 
judge which act would cause the best consequence. Buddhist ethics has focused on actual 
practice and its motivation, for the purpose of achieving enlightenment, rather than moral 
assessment after the act. Given that, it is plausible that we cannot interpret Buddhist ethics as a 
sort of objective consequentialism, which cannot provide any guidance about what an agent 
ought to do. These three aspects that I have derived from Goodman's work show the typical 
 
23 Charles Goodman, Consequences and Compassion: An Interpretation and Defense of Buddhist Ethics, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009, 204~207. 
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characteristics of the consequentialist approach to Buddhism. 
 One important ground of Buddhist ethics that the consequentialists commonly utilize is 
karma (業) theory. This notion, which had been shared by many Indian philosophical traditions, 
also takes an important role in Buddhism's understanding of motivation and practice. However, 
this theory actually does not per se include ethical implications, rather, it merely describes the 
causal relation between an act and its consequence. That is, it describes the proposition that 
every cause (因) must generate its fruit (果), and thereby, every agent must receive karmic 
retribution (業報) corresponding to pervious acts. It seems, however, that some consequentialists, 
including Goodman, actually try to derive a specific ethical implication from this proposition.24 
For example, Goodman says: 
The Buddha famously identified karma with intention. If motives and intentions control what kind of 
karma we receive from an action, and karma is a powerful source of future happiness and suffering, 
then obviously Buddhists should be concerned about it. But the role of karma in moral evaluation 
does not make Buddhist ethics nonconsequentialist; rather, on my interpretation, karmic 
consequences are among those that need to be considered in evaluating an action.25 
 
Karma connects the deed with its consequence by assigning causality between them. Therefore, 
we can anticipate which consequence we may receive as a result of what we do. This means that, 
conversely, we can decide what we will do based on an expected consequence which we may 
receive as a result. If we have a specific purpose that we want to achieve eventually, we may be 
likely to do an act which is expected to be helpful for the achievement. As Goodman describes, 
therefore, karmic consequence is indeed what we need to consider in the moral evaluation of an 
 
24 Deaman Ko strongly argues that Goodman's consequentialist approach is very dependent on karma theory. Cf. 
Daeman Ko, "Arguments on the Nature of Buddhist Ethics", Journal of Ethics Education Vol.35, 2014, 380~381. 
25 Charles Goodman, Consequences and Compassion: An Interpretation and Defense of Buddhist Ethics, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009, 208. 
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act. Karma theory allows us to anticipate what retributions we will receive and suggest the 
theoretical ground where our acts can be morally assessed in advance. And such, the moral 
assessment practically controls what we should do. As we have examined so far, the 
consequentialists derive the inner logic of their interpretations, which tries to decide what we do 
based on consequences expected, from karma theory. In this regard, there is no doubt that karma 
theory is one of the most important factors of the consequentialist approach. 
 I believe that those aspects of the consequentialist approach that we have shed light on 
can be considered to be representative, even though I have derived them only from Goodman's 
work. In the next chapter, I will examine the theoretical aspects of a selection of Chinese 
Buddhist ethics in order to discuss how the consequentialist approach should be denied or 
limited. In this process, the characteristics of the consequentialist approach will be refuted or 
rectified with additional explanation.  
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CHAPTER TWO: THE ETHICAL CONSTITUENTS OF THE AWAKENING 
 
 Before proceeding, it is necessary first to briefly take into consideration the relationship 
between the fields of Buddhism and ethics. Given that these two fields have historically 
developed with different interests and in separate locations, it seems that they would not 
correspond perfectly with each other. To be specific, the field of ethics, which had been mainly 
developed in Western scholarship, is commonly defined as "the study involved in practical 
reasoning: good, right, duty, obligation, virtue, freedom, rationality, choice."26 It considers some 
fundamental questions like 'what should be our conduct?', "what characters should we 
cultivate?", and "what social regulations should we have?" The issue of "how we should live 
with other beings in society" is the core of ethics. On the other hand, it seems that Buddhism 
focuses on an understanding of the world and an ideal goal to be achieved. Even though 
Buddhism suggests some guidance about 'how we should live', this must be understood in 
relation to its perspective and ideal goal.27 Therefore, the matter of how to live righteously may 
be not the first concern in Buddhism. However, when we consider that Buddhism has provided a 
systematic methodology to achieving its goal and has been asking us to follow it, answering the 
question of how to live righteously according to the Buddhist perspective is still important and 
valid. My point is, we can find a subordinate area in Buddhism, which shares same general types 
 
26 Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 1996, 126. 
27 For example, the Awakening describes this perspective as follows: "There are eight reasons [why I write this 
discourse which shows the teaching of Mahāyāna.] What are they? The first is a generic reason (總相). It is to make 
all sentient beings escape from every type of suffering and achieve the perfect happiness [by raising faith of the 
teaching in their mind.]" This generic reason assumes the perspective that every sentient being is suffering and they 
need to be freed from that. Cf. 馬鳴, 大乘起信論, "是因緣有八種. 云何為八? 一者, 因緣總相. 所謂為令眾生離一切苦, 得究竟
樂.", T32, 575b; Fazang explains that this perspective is not limited to the Awakening, and that is why Asvaghosa 
used the expression "generic reason (總相)." Cf. 法藏, 大乘起信論義記, "此之一門通於一切菩薩之心. 非局此論. 故云總相.", 
T44, 249a. 
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of concerns and interests with the field of ethics. We may label the study, which focuses on this 
area, as Buddhist ethics. This means that this thesis will be limited to this aspect.  
 Consequentialism is limited because it does not share the theoretical features of the 
Awakening even though some important concepts within the Awakening overlap. But I do not 
want to deny every aspect of what consequentialism has proposed, as its explanations are based 
on some supporting literary sources. Thus, it seems that their approach can be plausible. 
However, in this thesis, I am trying to define the limits of applying the consequentialist 
interpretation to the Buddhist structure of ethics within the Awakening. While this treatise has 
influenced the establishment and development of various Buddhist schools in China, it can be a 
controversial to argue that this treatise is representative of Chinese Buddhism. Hence, I will also 
illustrate the limits of the ethical interpretation I will derive from this treatise. Specifically, I will 
demonstrate that the ethical structure of the Awakening can only be applied to interpret other 
schools that share the notion of tathāgata-garbha (如來藏).28   
 The function of precepts (戒律)29 in Buddhism is consistent with the concerns that the 
 
28 In the Awakening, tathāgata-garbha is also called dharma-kāya (法身). This notion is explained as inherently 
having an infinite capacity of goodness (一切功德) and constituting one dimension of the mind of a sentient being, as 
an aspect of truth. Cf. 馬鳴, 大乘起信論, "復次, 真如自體相者, 一切凡夫, 聲聞, 緣覺, 菩薩, 諸佛, 無有增減, 非前際生, 
非後際滅, 畢竟常恒. 從本已來, 性自滿足一切功德. 所謂自體有大智慧光明義故, 遍照法界義故, 真實識知義故, 自性清淨心義故, 
常樂我淨義故, 清涼不變自在義故. 具足如是過於恒沙不離, 不斷, 不異, 不思議佛法, 乃至滿足無有所少義故, 名為如來藏, 
亦名如來法身.", T32, 579a. 
29 According to Charles Prebish, the concept of precepts (戒律) comprises two different aspects, that is, śīla (戒) and 
vinaya (律). In East Asian Buddhism, however, these two aspects have not been understood as separate things. He 
explains that vinaya is rendered as discipline or education in Buddhist communities. Cf. Charles Prebish, "From 
Monastic Ethics to Modern Society," edited by Damien Keown, in Contemporary Buddhist Ethics, London and New 
York: Routledge Curzon, 2000, 44~57; In this regard, Sunghyun Shin argues that the concept of śīla, which is 
derived from the root śīl, connotes the voluntary will to prevent evil. In this paper, I use the term 'precepts' to 
indicate the both aspects of śīla and vinaya. Cf. Sung-hyun Shin, "A Study on Understanding of Vinaya Pitaka in 
East Asian," Studies of Seon Culture Vol.19, 2015, 120~123. 
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field of ethics traditionally has.30 Given that, I believe that it is proper to start our discussion 
about Buddhist ethics from examining how precepts line up with ethics, even though ethics does 
not encompass all the theoretical aspects of Buddhist ethics. Discourse around Buddhist precepts 
is a huge part of Buddhism. For example, teaching is classified into the three teachings (三學), 
and the discourse on the precepts is labeled as the teaching of precepts (戒學). Also, in the 
classification of the three types of collections (三藏), the discourse on the precepts is included in 
them, and is called the collection about precepts (律藏). Indeed, the precepts are a very significant 
aspect of Buddhism.31 Precepts offer practical guidance on how to achieve a perfect character or 
wisdom. Observing the precepts is required of practitioners because the precepts are not only 
right in themselves, but also the fundamental method to achieve Buddhism’s ideal goal.  
 There are various sets of precepts in Buddhist tradition. In general, they differ from one 
another in terms of detail. In the case of the Awakening, this treatise frames the precepts in terms 
of the five ways of practice (修行五門). The Awakening is composed of five chapters (分): the 
reasons for writing (因緣分), outline (立義分), interpretation (解釋分), on faith and practice 
(修行信心分), and encouragement of practice and the benefits thereof (勸修利益分). The main 
chapters of the treatise are considered to be the second to the fourth, and the discourse on the 
precepts is included in the third chapter. This signifies that precepts are very significant. 
 
30 Sungtaek Cho broadly defines the philosophical meaning of the precept as "the general concept which 
incorporates every aspect of Buddhist ethics and includes regulations of Buddhist communities and their criteria." 
This definition shows how significant the precepts are in Buddhist ethics. However, I do not fully agree with his 
definition because I believe there are important things to be considered beyond the domain of the precepts in order 
to fully comprehend the whole shape of Buddhist ethics. Cf. Sungtaek Cho, "A New Approach to the Buddhist 
Precepts in the Modern society", Journal of Buddhist studies Vol.8, Korean Society of Buddhist Studies, 2004, 245. 
31 Daeman Ko, "Arguments on the Nature of Buddhist Ethics", Journal of Ethics Education Vol.35, 2014, 362. 
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Asvaghosa describes the five ways of practice as follows: 
From here, I will explain about the chapter on faith and practice (修行信心分). I will discuss the 
teaching of this chapter based on the circumstance of sentient beings who have not yet entered the 
group of sentient beings who are determined to achieve enlightenment (正定, =正定聚). (……) There 
are five ways of practice and they help the sentient beings to raise faith in their mind. What are the 
five practices? These are charity (布施), observance of precepts (持戒), patience (忍辱), zeal (精進), 
and cessation and observation (止觀).32 
 
The explanation of the five practices is one of two main axes of the chapter on faith and practice 
(修行信心分). It is offered to help sentient beings who are not yet in the group headed for being 
awakened (正定聚).33 In the detailed exposition of the method of each practice, the reader learns 
that first, charity is to help others, who are in need, with compassion; second, observance of 
precepts is to always obey various precepts, including the five practices; third, patience is to 
endure slander from others in order to prevent the practitioner and others from committing sins; 
fourth, zeal is to make an every effort to be awakened; and fifth, cessation and observation 
practice is a method to realize the truth of the world immediately.34 As we can see from the 
above, these precepts are suggested to help sentient beings raise their faith in the Mahāyāna 
teaching, and be awakened. 
 If we can say that most ethical theories are related to the moral evaluation of human acts, 
then practicing the five ways (五門) is among said theories. These practices are the core methods 
 
32 馬鳴, 大乘起信論, "次說修行信心分. 是中依未入正定眾生故, 說修行信心. (……) 修行有五門, 能成此信. 云何為五? 一者施門, 
二者戒門, 三者忍門, 四者進門, 五者止觀門.", T32, 581c. 
33 According to Fazang, this group is composed of sentient beings who are in the tenfold stages (十住). These 
sentient beings have a sturdy faith in the teaching so they do not retreat. Cf. 法藏, 大乘起信論義記, 
"菩薩十住已上決定不退名正定聚.", T44, 278b. 
34 馬鳴, 大乘起信論, T32, 581c~583a. 
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in the Awakening since there are no additional practical precepts in this treatise. In this regard, it 
is interesting that Asvaghosa (馬鳴) rearranged the sixfold Pāramitā practice (六波羅蜜), one of 
representative concepts in Mahāyāna tradition, to these five components by combining dhyāna 
(禪定) and prajnā (般若) into the cessation and observation practice. I believe that this 
rearrangement shows his specific intention to emphasize the special role of cessation and 
observation practice.35 This point seems to be clearly supported by the treatise in various ways. 
The first is the fact that Asvaghosa extensively describes this practice, more than the other four 
practices. In the fourth chapter, he describes those five practices in sequence and the former four 
practices are introduced briefly with similar lengths of explanations. However, the space he uses 
to discuss the method of the fifth practice is twice more than that of the total space used for the 
former ones. In addition, the discussion of the fifth practice is noticeably more detailed.36 These 
features accord with Asvaghosa’s intention in writing the Awakening. We can reaffirm this point 
from the introductory chapter, labeled as the reasons for writing (因緣分). There, he deals with 
eight generic reasons why he wrote this treatise. Letting sentient beings learn how to practice 
cessation and observation is included as a sixth one.37 My point is, offering exposition of the fifth 
practice is one of his main purposes of this work. Not only is the fifth practice more important 
than the other four practices, its function is different from the first four ones. In the case of the 
 
35 It seems that Asvaghosa was aware of the original components of the sixfold Pāramitā since he lists these six 
components in another explanation. From this fact, we can guess that he rearranged these components with such an 
intention. Cf. Ibid., "若說布施, 持戒, 忍辱, 精進, 禪定, 智慧.", T32, 582b. 
36 In contrast to the first four practices, for instance, this fifth practice is explained to have a theoretical relationship 
with the important notions of the Awakening, such as one mind, samādhi of Suchness, and great compassion. 
However, the explanation of the first ones are actually no more than a repetition of a conventional understanding of 
them. This difference between the practices gives an impression that the fifth practice is more significant in the 
ethical theory of the Awakening.  
37 Ibid., "六者, 為示修習止觀, 對治凡夫二乘心過故.", T32, 575c. 
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four practices, Asvaghosa addresses why practitioners should observe them with only one 
illustration that following them is helpful in raising faith in their mind. That is, as faith deepens, 
sentient beings gradually get closer to the circumstance for awakening. However, Asvaghosa 
offers more fundamental reasons why practitioners should observe the fifth practice. He says: 
[s]ince practitioner's mind abides [with equanimity (止)], it will be gradually sharpened and then he 
will be absorbed into the samādhi of Suchness (眞如三昧). [Thereby,] his defilements (煩惱) will be 
deeply suppressed and his faith will be strengthened. So he will quickly attain the state where there 
will be no regression. (……) The samādhi of Suchness is the state in which a practitioner does not 
stick to the function of seeing something (見相) nor the function of experiencing something (得相). 
And further, [this is the state] in which the practitioner will not be indolent nor arrogant even after he 
gets out of this samādhi. So his defilements will gradually decrease. No sentient being can enter the 
group which is determined to become Tathāgatā (如來種性) without practicing this samādhi. (……) A 
sentient being who wants to practice observation (觀) should observe that all conditioned dharmas 
(有為之法) in the world are impermanent, so they are extinguished in a moment; and that all mental 
activities (心行) arise and disappear from moment to moment so they are the source of suffering.38 
 
The detailed explanation of the cessation and observation practice is dealt with in the part of 
practice and faith. According to that, this practice includes setting the mind at rest (止) and 
observing the truth of the phenomenal world (觀). These two should be practiced simultaneously. 
Otherwise, practitioners cannot achieve enlightenment.39 Here we can find that the distinct 
function of the fifth practice is not a merely to raise faith in practitioners' mind. Rather, its 
practice is immediately involved with the awakening itself, and this is the main reason why this 
practice is required. As Asvaghosa describes above, entering the samādhi of Suchness is a 
necessary course for practitioners in order to achieve enlightenment. This means that they cannot 
 
38 Ibid., "以心住故, 漸漸猛利, 隨順得入真如三昧, 深伏煩惱, 信心增長, 速成不退. (……) 真如三昧者, 不住見相, 不住得相, 
乃至出定亦無懈慢, 所有煩惱漸漸微薄. 若諸凡夫, 不習此三昧法, 得入如來種性, 無有是處. (……) 修習觀者, 當觀一切世間有為之法, 
無得久停, 須臾變壞, 一切心行, 念念生滅, 以是故苦.", T32, 582a. 
39  Ibid., "若行若住, 若臥若起, 皆應止觀俱行. (……) 是止觀二門, 共相助成, 不相捨離. 若止觀不具, 則無能入菩提之道.", T32, 
583a. 
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be awakened without performing this practice. He also describes that the practice of observing 
the truth of the phenomenal world, which is the important part of cessation and observation 
practice, is the root (根本方便) of every type of practice.40 In other words, this practice is actually 
the only way for practitioners to immediately enter the stage of awakening while the other four 
practices are regarded as mere secondary means to raise faith in their mind.  
This interpretation does not deny that the four practices are also what lead practitioners 
into the stage of enlightenment in the long-term perspective. However, they are still obviously 
supplementary. For instance, the difference in the moral motivations that those two types of 
practices respectively involve supports this point. We can say that they have the same final 
purpose of achieving enlightenment when we interpret them broadly. However, when it comes to 
the moral motivations of them, there are distinctions in their purpose. The four practices, as 
Asvaghosa describes, are presented in order to raise faith in practitioners' minds. These practices, 
such as helping others or enduring insults may be good actions in themselves, but they are not 
immediately related to the final achievement of awakening. Rather, they are basically meant to 
test their faith in the teachings and strengthen resolve. In other words, these are practiced with 
the motivation to raise faith in their mind, and eventually enter the group determined to achieve 
enlightenment. In contrast, practicing the fifth way is not a supplementary method, but the 
process of awakening itself. Given that, the moral motivation for this practice should be 
understood as different from the other one of the former practices. In fact, the fifth practice is 
less related to performing good actions to save others, but to achieve practitioner's own 
enlightenment. However, the fifth practice is explained to cause practitioners to realize the sorry 
 
40 Ibid., "一者行根本方便. 謂觀一切法自性無生, 離於妄見, 不住生死. 觀一切法因緣和合, 業果不失, 起於大悲修諸福德, 
攝化眾生不住涅槃, 以隨順法性無住故.", T32, 580c. 
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truth of the world and to raise great compassion (大悲心) in their mind. In other words, when a 
practitioner completes this practice, he must realize that sentient beings who have not yet 
awakened suffer from being attached to this conditioned world. Thereby, the practitioner raises 
great compassion in his mind and makes a vow (誓願) to help and save them.41 So the 
practitioner performs good actions because of his commitment of saving others. Here, he is 
supposed to have the only one moral motivation caused by practicing the fifth way, which is 
different from the motivation for conducting the four practices. While the first four practices 
encourage good acts to raise faith in the mind to achieve enlightenment in the future, the last one 
is just doing good actions to help others.  
 These five practices can be valid only after the possibility of awakening is postulated as 
they are basically required for that purpose. Thus, the assumption that enlightenment can be 
ensured as a possibility, is a foundational in the ethical theory of the Awakening. This 
assumption is called Suchness (眞如), and is described as  
[t]he teaching of Mahāyāna (摩訶衍) can be explained in two aspects. What are they? The first is the 
essence (法) and the second is features (義).  
The body means mind of a sentient being. This mind subsumes every dharma (法) in the worlds 
which are conditioned (世間) and unconditioned (出世間). The characteristics are manifested based on 
this mind. Why? This is because the true aspect of this mind (眞如相) manifests a ground (體) of the 
teaching of Mahāyāna, and the other aspect, which arises and disappears, manifests the ground (體), 
characteristics (相), and functions (用) of Mahāyāna itself.  
 
41 The causal relation between observing the truth in the samādhi of Suchness and raising the compassion in their 
mind is described in various places in the Awakening. Below shows some examples of them. Ibid., "復次, 若人唯修於止, 
則心沈沒或起懈怠, 不樂眾善, 遠離大悲, 是故修觀. (……) 如是當念：「一切眾生從無始世來, 皆因無明所熏習故令心生滅, 
已受一切身心大苦. 現在即有無量逼迫, 未來所苦亦無分齊, 難捨難離而不覺知. 眾生如是, 甚為可愍.」 作此思惟, 
即應勇猛立大誓願：「願令我心離分別故, 遍於十方修行一切諸善功德, 盡其未來, 以無量方便救拔一切苦惱眾生, 令得涅槃第一義樂.」 
以起如是願故, 於一切時, 一切處, 所有眾善, 隨已堪能不捨修學, 心無懈怠, 唯除坐時專念於止. (……) 修觀者, 對治二乘不起
大悲狹劣心過, 遠離凡夫不修善根.", T32, 582c~583a; Fazang explains that the good will (誓願) is derived from this 
compassion. Cf. 法藏, 大乘起信論義記, “大願觀中因悲立願.”, T44, 286a. 
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There are three features. What are they? The first is the greatness of the ground (體大). It indicates 
that Suchness in every sentient being is the same (平等) so it does not increase nor decrease. The 
second is the greatness of characteristics (相大). It indicates that Tathāgata-garbha (如來藏) includes 
numberless supreme goodness (功德). The third is the greatness of functions (用大). It indicates that 
[the essence (法)] can generate every type of good cause and fruit (善因果) in the worlds which are 
conditioned and unconditioned. [We can know that] because every Buddha (佛) has depended [on 
this essence] and every Bodhisattva (菩薩) also enters the stage of Tathāgata (如來地) by depending 
on this essence.42 
 
Suchness is a kind of universal concept which assures achieving enlightenment of every sentient 
being. It has an infinite capacity for goodness and generates every good cause (因) and fruit 
(果).43 It is explained that every sentient being, including Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, can enter 
the final stage of awakening by depending on it. The way to the final achievement is to recover 
the original pure aspect of this Suchness. Therefore, this ontological postulation of Suchness is 
necessary to explain the methods to head towards the awakening, including doing good practices. 
Asvaghosa further describes about this concept as 
two aspects (門) in one mind. What are they? The first is a true aspect of the mind (心眞如) and the 
second is an aspect of the mind, which arises and disappears (心生滅). These two aspects respectively 
subsume every dharmas. Why? Because those two aspects are not different from one another. 
The true aspect of the mind is a single dharma-dhatu (一法界). This is the generic ground (體) of 
every dharma, which subsumes those two aspects of the mind. So to speak, this mind is neither what 
arises nor disappears. Every dharma differs (差別) only based on the aspect of the mind, which arises 
and disappears. If this aspect disappeared, there must be no [differentiation of] object (境界).  
Therefore, the true aspect of the mind, from its beginning, cannot be explained by discourses (言說) 
nor illustrated by words (名字), nor conceived by thinking (心緣). This must be a same single one so 
it does not change (變異) nor break (破壞). This is only one mind (一心), which is called Suchness. 
(……) [This mind] which is called Suchness also does not have [its corresponsive] object (相). So to 
 
42 馬鳴, 大乘起信論, "摩訶衍者, 總說有二種. 云何為二? 一者法, 二者義. 所言法者, 謂眾生心. 是心則攝一切世間法, 出世間法. 
依於此心, 顯示摩訶衍義. 何以故? 是心真如相, 即示摩訶衍體故, 是心生滅因緣相, 能示摩訶衍自體相用故. 所言義者, 則有三種. 
云何為三? 一者, 體大, 謂一切法真如平等不增減故. 二者, 相大, 謂如來藏具足無量性功德故. 三者, 用大, 能生一切世間, 
出世間善因果故. 一切諸佛本所乘故, 一切菩薩皆乘此法到如來地故.", T32, 575c. 
43 In terms with these good cause and fruit, Fazang explains that Suchness leads sentient beings to earn goodness in 
the mundane world (世間), and then achieve awakening (成出世). Cf. 法藏, 大乘起信論義記, 
“令諸眾生始成世善終成出世故也.”, T44, 251a. 
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speak, it is to discard its name (遣言) by naming it with the closest name (言說之極) [to its meaning, 
that is, Suchness]. (……) If [a practitioner] ceases (離) his mind, which arises and disappears, then it is 
called entering [a state of wisdom (得入)].44   
  
This detailed explanation of the two aspects of one mind (一心二門) shows the theoretical 
relationship between Suchness and the mind of sentient beings. Asvaghosa describes that this 
Suchness is not an object that we can empirically examine through thought or language. It is 
supposed to be equally inherent in every sentient being. It also does not change as time passes 
by. Suchness is postulated in the Awakening as a kind of a metaphysical concept. Additionally, 
this Suchness is explained in the above to be covered by the delusion (無明) from its beginning.45 
It manifests itself only based on the deluded aspect of mind, which arises and disappears. 
However, it actually does not mean that those two aspects are separated from one another. This is 
because Suchness is nothing but what the deluded aspect has erased from the mind. Recovering 
this original pure aspect of mind is understood to be the final achievement in the treatise. In this 
sense, achieving enlightenment is an inherent possibility. This point is supported by the word 
'original enlightenment (本覺)' which appears in the treatise.46 This concept basically implies two 
significant characteristics of Suchness. The first one is that Suchness, the ground of awakening, 
is pure and unconditioned. The other is that it assures the awakening of every sentient being by 
 
44  馬鳴, 大乘起信論, "依一心法, 有二種門. 云何為二? 一者心真如門, 二者心生滅門. 是二種門, 皆各總攝一切法. 此義云何? 
以是二門不相離故. 心真如者, 即是一法界, 大總相法門體. 所謂心性不生不滅. 一切諸法唯依妄念而有差別, 
若離妄念則無一切境界之相. 是故一切法, 從本已來, 離言說相, 離名字相, 離心緣相, 畢竟平等, 無有變異, 不可破壞. 唯是一心. (……) 
言真如者, 亦無有相. 謂言說之極, 因言遣言. (……) 若離於念, 名為得入.", T32, 576a. 
45 Ibid., "是心從本已來自性清淨而有無明, 為無明所染, 有其染心.", T32, 577b. 
46 Ibid., "離念相者, 等虛空界, 無所不遍, 法界一相, 即是如來平等法身, 依此法身, 說名本覺. 何以故? 本覺義者, 對始覺義說, 
以始覺者即同本覺.", T32, 576b. 
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being universally inherent in their mind. Meanwhile, we can find that the method to recover 
Suchness, that is to cease the deluded mind, corresponds to an important part of the fifth practice 
that Asvaghosa emphasizes. Hence the point that the fifth practice is immediately related to 
awakening is proven here again. 
 Suchness also inherently holds perfectly pure (無漏) goodness (功德). According to the 
Awakening, this goodness manifests as the pure function of wisdom (智淨相) and the function of 
incomprehensible karma (不思議業相). These help a sentient being to cease his deluded mind and 
recover his inherent pure mind.47 Even though wisdom and karma are revealed in the deluded 
aspect of mind, they are still pure. In addition, the pure goodness has another function to help 
sentient beings to achieve enlightenment. This function is labeled as the function from the body 
of enlightenment (覺體相).48 The body of enlightenment (覺體) is nothing but Suchness. Since 
Suchness is not an object of empirical examination, as I discussed above, nor does this function 
depend on the deluded aspect of mind. Hence, these functions imply that Suchness immediately 
and positively affects sentient beings so that they can be awakened. These functions are actually 
introduced in the treatise with the other name, permeation (熏習), and it will be discussed again in 
 
47 Ibid., "復次, 本覺隨染, 分別生二種相, 與彼本覺不相捨離. 云何為二? 一者, 智淨相, 二者, 不思議業相. 智淨相者, 謂依法力熏習, 
如實修行, 滿足方便故. 破和合識相, 滅相續心相, 顯現法身, 智淳淨故. (……) 不思議業相者, 以依智淨能作一切勝妙境界, 
所謂無量功德之相常無斷絕, 隨眾生根自然相應, 種種而見, 得利益故.", T32, 576c. 
48 Ibid., "復次, 覺體相者, 有四種大義, 與虛空等, 猶如淨鏡. 云何為四? 一者, 如實空鏡. 遠離一切心境界相, 無法可現, 非覺照義故. 
二者, 因熏習鏡. 謂如實不空, 一切世間境界悉於中現, 不出不入, 不失不壞, 常住一心, 以一切法即真實性故; 又一切染法所不能染, 
智體不動, 具足無漏熏眾生故. 三者, 法出離鏡. 謂不空法, 出煩惱礙, 智礙, 離和合相, 淳淨明故. 四者, 緣熏習鏡. 謂依法出離故, 
遍照眾生之心, 令修善根, 隨念示現故.", T32, 576c. 
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the next chapter as a proof to refute the consequentialist approach.  
 As we have examined, awakening involves that a practitioner obtains some pure 
functions of Suchness and utilizes them at some level. According to the treatise, a practitioner 
can realize the truth of the world by the pure functions holding perfect wisdom. In this regard, 
the treatise describes that there is luminosity of great wisdom (大智慧光明) in the body of 
Suchness (自體). This wisdom has the function of penetrating (照) the whole dharma-dhatu (法界) 
and knowing the truth (眞實識知) of that.49 This point corresponds with the description about the 
observation (觀) practice that I cited above. There, a practitioner is supposed to enter the samādhi 
of Suchness first, and then, observe the truth of the phenomenal world. As we have examined, a 
practitioner's great compassion and good will (誓願) are generated as a result of achieving the 
truth of the phenomenal world. Therefore, I believe that the pure functions of Suchness can be 
broadly understood as moral ground for a practitioner.50 That is to say, a practitioner realizes the 
truth based on the pure functions of Suchness, and then they come to know what they should do 
for other beings who are in need. The ground for moral determination and action lies in the 
inherent functions of Suchness. In this sense, we can say that the norm for moral determination 
in the Awakening is prepared in the ontological ground that is called Suchness. This implies that 
the moral standard is inherently within the agent, and that it does not change based on 
circumstance. These implications of the ethical theory of the Awakening will be discussed again 
in the next chapter as well.  
 
49 Ibid., "所謂自體有大智慧光明義故, 遍照法界義故, 真實識知義故.", T32, 579a. 
50 I discussed the ethical meaning of this pure function of Suchness elsewhere. Cf. Jinsub Song, "A Study on the 
Stereotyped Formality of the Ethical Theory of Mahayana Buddhism", Journal of Philosophical Ideas Vol. 46, 
Institute of Philosophy of Seoul National University, 2012, 6~20. 
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 To sum up, the ethical discussion on the structure of the Awakening starts from the idea 
of the five ways of practice. These ways could be workable only after postulating the ontological 
ground of Suchness. Achieving enlightenment, the ultimate practical purpose, is guaranteed by 
the postulation of Suchness. Thus, Suchness is that which is manifest by the practices, and at the 
same time, the condition that makes the practices possible. This theoretical feature shows that the 
whole ethical theory of the Awakening is established on the basis of ontological grounds. As we 
discussed in the last chapter, some consequentialists had tried to incorporate some important 
conceptual constituents of Buddhism in their interpretation, but it seems that they failed to catch 
the important ontological discourses around the mind of a sentient being. I believe this omission 
can be finally turned out as a critical weak point of their approach. In the next chapter, I will 
further contrast the consequentialist application to the Awakening, and raise important ethical 
ideas based on the ontological ground.  
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CHAPTER THREE: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSEQUENTIALIST APPROACH 
AND AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE ETHICS OF THE 
AWAKENING 
 
 As demonstrated by Goodman’s flawed interpretations in the first chapter, 
consequentialists can derive their interpretations from selective descriptions of Buddhist precepts 
found in the Awakening. These precepts are related to traditional Buddhist ideas that are 
relatively common in Buddhist schools, but do not express the core ideas of the Awakening’s 
ethical theory. It is necessary to examine these descriptions first because they can be 
foundational to the consequentialist approach.  
 The first idea is about the instrumental approach to the precepts for the benefit of the 
practitioner and others (自利利他). In this idea, the precepts are assumed to be a means to obtain 
benefits. Asvaghosa claims that his motivation for writing the Awakening is that when sentient 
beings practice his precepts, the profitability of his lessons will be self-evident to the practitioner 
and others.51 Sentient beings are supposed to be motivated to raise faith in their minds to practice 
samādhi of Suchness (眞如三昧), which may immediately allow the practitioner to enter the final 
stage of awakening.52 In fact, the main point of Awakening’s last chapter is to emphasize that 
holding to this treatise and its teachings are beneficial. It is especially interesting that Asvaghosa 
considers that the benefit from holding to the treatise is superior to the goodness from reforming 
 
51 馬鳴, 大乘起信論, "八者, 為示利益勸修行故. 有如是等因緣, 所以造論."; "三者, 信法有大利益, 常念修行諸波羅蜜故. 四者, 信僧
能正修行自利利他.", T32, 575c. 
52 Ibid., "復次, 精勤專心修學此三昧者, 現世當得十種利益. 云何為十? 一者, 常為十方諸佛菩薩之所護念. 二者, 不為諸魔惡鬼所能恐怖. 
三者, 不為九十五種外道鬼神之所惑亂. 四者, 遠離誹謗甚深之法重罪, 業障漸漸微薄. 五者, 滅一切疑諸惡覺觀. 六者, 於
如來境界信得增長. 七者, 遠離憂悔, 於生死中勇猛不怯. 八者, 其心柔和,捨於憍慢,不為他人所惱. 九者, 雖未得定, 於一切時一切境界處, 
則能減損煩惱, 不樂世間. 十者, 若得三昧, 不為外緣一切音聲之所驚動.", T32, 582c. 
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(化, = 敎化) every sentient being in the universe (三千大千世界).53 Of course, this phrase has room 
to be understood as a rhetorical expression. In the previous chapter, I discussed that the benefit 
Asvaghosa refers to is explicitly a practitioner setting himself and others free from the suffering 
of living in ignorance of the truth. Thus, the first idea of the consequentialist approach is a 
misinterpretation of the sections emphasizing the benefits of the final stage of awakening as an 
encouragement for practitioners to pursue good consequences as an ultimate goal. This is a short 
sided understanding of what should motivate sentient beings to start practicing the precepts. 
 Another descriptive aspect of the Awakening that the consequentialists can misread is 
regarding karma theory. In the treatise, Asvaghosa says that, “[y]ou are not free because of the 
karmic retribution you will receive based on the karma you made."54 This common idea in 
various Buddhist schools is that a cause (因) must involve consequence (果). As we could find 
from Goodman's explanation of karma in the first chapter, the consequentialist approach 
interprets karmic consequences as the most important site for morally evaluating actions. The 
logic assumes that because a sentient being is strongly encouraged to cause good consequences, 
including being awakened, achieving those good consequences is the practical goal of Buddhist 
teaching. Actions that may generate good consequences must surely considered to be morally 
good. Therefore, the practitioner determines what kinds of deeds he should conduct or avoid 
based on the expected consequences they would generate.  
 
53 Ibid., "次說勸修利益分. 如是摩訶衍諸佛祕藏, 我已總說. 若有眾生, 欲於如來甚深境界得生正信, 遠離誹謗入大乘道, 
當持此論思量修習, 究竟能至無上之道. 若人聞是法已不生怯弱, 當知此人定紹佛種, 必為諸佛之所授記. 
假使有人能化三千大千世界滿中眾生令行十善, 不如有人於一食頃正思此法, 過前功德不可為喻. 復次, 若人受持此論觀察修行, 
若一日一夜, 所有功德無量無邊不可得說. 假令十方一切諸佛, 各於無量無邊阿僧祇劫, 歎其功德, 亦不能盡. 何以故? 
謂法性功德無有盡故. 此人功德亦復如是, 無有邊際.", T32, 583a~b. 
54 Ibid., "以依業受果, 不自在故.", T32, 577a. 
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 The concepts of the benefits for sentient beings and karma are shared by many Buddhist 
treatises. However, these concepts are actually just descriptive in the Awakening, rather than 
prescriptive. The descriptions about those concepts in the treatise merely offer an exposition of 
how they work. But these, in themselves, do not prescribe how a practitioner should interpret 
those concepts and how he should conduct himself in accordance to them. That is, they do not 
provide a formulaic norm for evaluating the morality of actions. For instance, the benefits that 
the treatise claims to give to sentient beings is just describing that some Buddhist goals involve 
benefits for practitioners. Indeed, it does not imply that the benefits must be considered the final 
goal of their practice, and simultaneously the standard for moral evaluation. Rather, it is possible 
to understand conducting good practices or actions to be moral in themselves. In this 
understanding, the benefits of faithful practice can be regarded as just felicitous coincidences 
rather than expected rewards earned by conducting good deeds. Similarly, karma theory also 
merely describes the causality between a cause and its consequence. It does not prescribe that we 
should consider expected consequences in order to determine what we ought to do. Those 
normative interpretations about the two concepts are actually the results of consequentialists 
interpreting the basic Buddhist concepts to their own advantage.  
 While the first two characteristics of the consequentialist approaches are interpretations 
shared by that school of thought, the third one is proposed specifically by Goodman. Goodman 
argues that moral evaluation of actions must be based on expected consequences, rather than 
ones that have transpired. In other words, this argument means that the intention that aims to earn 
the best consequences should be the standard for evaluating the action’s morality. I think that this 
consequentialist interpretation about the relationship between intention of an action and its 
morality is valid. This is because the five ways of practice are required for the purpose of 
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achieving good consequences. As we have seen in the last chapter, the first four practices and the 
fifth practice respectively raise faith in a practitioner's mind or achieve enlightenment 
immediately. If these purposes can be understood to be a kind of desirable consequence, it is 
hard to deny the interpretation that pursuing good consequences fulfils the purpose of these 
practices. Here, striving for good consequences provides the moral intention. Even though the 
Awakening’s descriptions about the benefits of sentient beings do not outline any normative 
statements like Goodman does, his interpretation of moral intent makes the consequentialist 
understanding of the benefits plausible. Again, if the beneficial consequences of moral intention 
includes achieving enlightenment which may set the practitioner free from suffering, then the 
consequentialists can justify using their moral intention as practicing the five practices. 
 However, the five ways of practice are also misread if they correspond to the 
consequentialist logic. The practitioners can give the impression that they are conducting the 
practices for the purpose of having good consequences. However, such an impression is only 
possible when they analyze just a portion of the whole ethical system of the Awakening. Indeed, 
they are missing an important task in learning Buddhist ethics, which is to grasp the ethical role 
of the ontological ground of Suchness and incorporate it into their ethical evaluations. If 
consequentialists continue approaching Buddhist treatises like the Awakening through their own 
established perspectives, their attempts will remain highly restricted.  
 Hence, the consequentialist approach can be critically refuted based on its lack of the 
ontological ground, Suchness. The first reason that I can oppose the possibility of the 
consequentialist approach to this treatise is that the treatise does not explain the final cause of 
performing practices as a mere desire to earn good consequences. Rather, the final cause is 
naturally derived from Suchness, through the permeation of Suchness (眞如熏習). According to 
34 
 
 
Asvaghosa, the permeation of Suchness can be illustrated like this:  
How does the permeation (熏習) occur and raise the pure state (淨法) continuously? So to speak, 
since there is the principle of Suchness (眞如法), the delusion (無明) is permeated [by it]. Because of 
the force (因緣力) of this permeation, the deluded mind gets to hate the suffering from birth and death 
and like to be awakened. Because the cause (因緣), which triggers [the deluded mind] hate the 
suffering of birth and death and like to be awakened, is included within the deluded mind, [this mind] 
is permeated by Suchness. [A sentient being who has] the deluded mind comes to believe in his 
Suchness and know that what exists is only from the vain activity of the mind and that there is no real 
object (境界) in front of him. [So he] comes to practice to set [himself] free from the objects [遠離行], 
and then, he comes to clearly know that there is no object existent in front of him. Thereby, [he will] 
conduct practices that follow Suchness (隨順行) with various expedients (方便), and then, [he will] 
not attach to [something] nor give rise to any deluded thought. Furthermore, the delusion will be 
disappeared by the force of the permeation from Suchness over a long time. (……) It is said to 
achieve the enlightenment and complete the dharma of nature (自然業).55 
 
The notion of permeation here is a figurative expression which indicates that the sentient being is 
continuously and invisibly affected by being of Suchness just as a cloth is permeated by scents of 
other objects.56 Also, Suchness is not in a different mind from the deluded one. Therefore, it is 
assumed that there is always pure Suchness within the mind. This pure aspect continuously 
releases a beneficial force, and this innate function is called the permeation of Suchness. Having 
faith in the mind and conducting practices to achieve enlightenment are all the caused by the 
force of this permeation.  
 Hence, we can say that sentient beings' intention to raise faith and head toward 
awakening is also a result of the permeation. That is, the intention is not a mere desire to earn 
good consequences, but a result caused from the function of pure wisdom of Suchness. This fact 
actually goes against the consequentialist logic whose the final purpose in this logic is to earn 
 
55 Ibid., "云何熏習起淨法不斷? 所謂以有真如法故能熏習無明, 以熏習因緣力故, 則令妄心厭生死苦, 樂求涅槃. 
以此妄心有厭求因緣故, 即熏習真如. 自信己性, 知心妄動無前境界. 修遠離法, 以如實知無前境界故, 種種方便起隨順行, 不取不念, 
乃至久遠熏習力故, 無明則滅. (……) 名得涅槃成自然業.", T32, 578b. 
56 Ibid., "熏習義者. 如世衣服非臭非香. 隨以物熏則有彼氣. (……) 無明染法實無淨業. 真如熏故說有淨用.", T32, 586c. 
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good consequences. Indeed, even the reason why the consequentialists consider awakening to be 
the ideal goal is that it is included in the list of those good consequences. Good consequences 
take on the role of being the standard for moral evaluation, and they determine which actions 
should be regarded as good or bad. However, the concept of the pure permeation shows a very 
different logic. The most critical fact is that the awakening is pursued not because of the purpose 
of earning good consequences. Rather, the awakening is assumed to be naturally pursued by the 
functions of Suchness, such as the pure wisdom. The practices, including the five ways of 
practice, are also considered to be naturally known to sentient beings because of the functions of 
Suchness. In the Awakening, therefore, the norm for moral evaluation is not derived from the 
consequences of actions, but from the pure functions of Suchness which is the ontological 
ground. Furthermore, specific actions’ morality is to be determined based on the functions of 
Suchness, not the practitioner’s expectations. 
 A further detailed explanation of two different aspects of the permeation of Suchness 
clearly illustrates this difference. First, according to the Awakening, the permeation by being of 
Suchness itself (眞如自體相熏習) manifests with the practitioner delightfully raising the faith of 
Suchness in their mind and seeking for awakening because he was affected by a being of 
Suchness.57 This is the source caused through the inner (內因), which makes the sentient being 
head toward the right way. The second aspect is the permeation by the function of Suchness 
(用熏習). The treatise describes that the function of Suchness appears as an outer figure like 
Buddha, Bodhisattva, or a family member. This figure encourages every practitioner to head 
 
57 Ibid., "真如熏習義有二種. 云何為二? 一者, 自體相熏習, 二者, 用熏習. 自體相熏習者, 從無始世來, 具無漏法備, 有不思議業, 作
境界之性. 依此二義恒常熏習, 以有力故, 能令眾生厭生死苦, 樂求涅槃, 自信己身有真如法, 發心修行.", T32, 578b. 
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toward the right way to awakening.58 This function is from the outer (外緣) and supports the 
practitioner's practice, too. Asvaghosa uses the simile of wood in order to explain the 
relationship of those two aspects. According to him, the permeation by being of Suchness itself 
is like the nature of wood that can burn (火性), and the permeation by the function of Suchness is 
like the action that ignites the wood. As both aspects are required to burn the wood, those two 
different types of permeations are also required for sentient beings to be awakened.59 And those 
permeations are actually explained to be naturally given by being of Suchness per se. Therefore, 
every sentient being is assumed to raise faith of the truth in their mind and conduct practices 
naturally because of these fundamental functions of Suchness.  
This notion of permeations implies that what sentient beings practice is a result of being 
permeated by Suchness at some level. In this theoretical structure, having a desire to achieve 
enlightenment is not for pursuing good consequences, but the result from being permeated by 
Suchness. That is, the sentient beings remove the delusion in their mind and achieve awakening 
naturally based on being of Suchness, not based on the expectation of good consequences. From 
this ethical structure, we can reconfirm that the reason why a practitioner does practice is quite 
different from the basic logic of consequentialism. The approach from such perspective, 
therefore, cannot be properly workable.  
 
58 Ibid., "用熏習者, 即是眾生外緣之力. 如是外緣有無量義, 略說二種. 云何為二? 一者, 差別緣, 二者, 平等緣. 差別緣者, 此人依於諸佛
菩薩等, 從初發意始求道時乃至得佛, 於中若見若念, 或為眷屬父母諸親, 或為給使, 或為知友, 或為怨家, 或起四攝, 乃至一切
所作無量行緣, 以起大悲熏習之力, 能令眾生增長善根, 若見若聞得利益故. 此緣有二種. 云何為二? 一者, 近緣, 速得度故. 二者, 遠緣, 
久遠得度故. 是近遠二緣, 分別復有二種. 云何為二? 一者, 增長行緣, 二者, 受道緣. 平等緣者, 一切諸佛菩薩, 皆願度脫一切眾生, 
自然熏習恒常不捨. 以同體智力故, 隨應見聞而現作業. 所謂眾生依於三昧, 乃得平等見諸佛故.", T32, 578c. 
59 Ibid., "如木中火性是火正因, 若無人知, 不假方便, 能自燒木, 無有是處. 眾生亦爾, 雖有正因熏習之力, 
若不值遇諸佛菩薩善知識等以之為緣, 能自斷煩惱入涅槃者, 則無是處. 若雖有外緣之力, 而內淨法未有熏習力者, 
亦不能究竟厭生死苦樂求涅槃.", T32, 578c. 
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 In regard to the matter of moral intention, we can find another problem in the 
consequentialist approach because of the moral intention of ideal characters in Buddhism, such 
as a Buddha or Bodhisattva. As we have discussed in the examining the fifth way of practice, a 
sentient being is supposed to raise the great compassion in his mind after realizing the truth of 
the conditioned world. So he comes to make a vow to save others and put great compassion into 
actual practice. In this case, this ideal one, who has already achieved enlightenment, feels pity 
for what the others are suffering in the world. His moral intention here is assumed to be what 
aims to help and save them. Namely, he conducts good deeds because he feels pity in his mind. 
However, the consequentialist approach explains the purpose of performing good deeds as 
causing good consequences. Feeling pity for others is not necessary in consequentialist 
interpretation. This is one of the important points that their interpretation omit. The reason why 
the awakening is considered to be good is that the ideal characters involved in it will generate 
good consequences for every sentient being due to feeling pity. However, as the ideal characters 
show, even though it is true that the great compassion can cause good consequences for the 
others, it is actually not defined as a feeling that just wants to make the good consequences. The 
norm for moral evaluation in the idea of the great compassion is dependent on whether the 
practitioner feels pity for the other in his mind and acts according that feeling, not whether he 
merely intended to cause good consequences. This is because the great compassion is ultimately 
derived from the perfect wisdom of Suchness. However, the consequentialist approach does not 
theoretically include this pure altruistic intention of the compassion. Thus, this idea can cause a 
problem to the approach by suggesting another type of pure intention that is different from 
consequentialist one. In this respect, consequentialist interpretation does not fully elucidate the 
teaching of the Awakening by skirting around the core aspect of an ideal character in the 
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teaching.  
 The other reason why the Awakening cannot properly align with the consequentialist 
approach is related to the calculation of expected consequences. The calculation assumes it can 
find the greatest benefit among the possible consequences. This calculation, which shares the 
same historical trajectory with the tradition of classic consequentialism, cannot be considered 
plausible without this assumption. Otherwise, it would be impossible to determine which action 
is morally better than other options. This assumption seems to have been transposed to 
consequentialist interpretations of Buddhist doctrine. The second theoretical characteristic of 
Goodman's approach is a typical example of this assumption. Goodman argues that the moral 
values of possible consequences, including achieving enlightenment, can be quantified and 
compared one another in order to choose the best one. The result of this calculation is supposed 
to be the basis of determining which option is morally better, and thereby, what we ought to do.  
 However, there is actually no description that implies this type of assumption in the 
Awakening. Rather, we can find the other descriptions which are discordant to the case of 
calculating the benefit. For example, the charity (布施) and patience (忍辱) practices in the five 
ways of practice shows that practitioners and others do not calculate the benefits of the practices 
amongst themselves. Benefit or loss is not considered for determining if practitioners conduct 
practices or not. Even if it is possible that practicing the ways can lead to a terrible result for the 
practitioner, this negative possibility is never considered before conducting practices. The only 
fact we can deduce is that practitioners are just required to follow these practices in every 
circumstance. The typical illustration about Buddha, who postponed his nirvana in order to save 
the every sentient being, also supports this point. Practitioners may practice sometimes to benefit 
himself or sometimes for the benefit of others, but he does not calculate the possible benefits to 
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find which practice will cause the best consequence. Consequences are really not the standard for 
evaluating morality here. Rather, practitioners are supposed to follow the pure wisdom from 
Suchness in order to conduct what he ought to do. We have examined that practitioners come to 
conduct practices, and thereby, head toward awakening as a result of being permeated by the 
wisdom of Suchness due to the pure function of Suchness. Hence this ethical structure of the 
Awakening cannot be interpreted as consequentialism. 
 The more problematic implication of the assumption of calculation is that some Buddhist 
precepts can be violated after the moral values of their expected consequences are compared to 
one another. This violation can be justified by the consequentialist interpretation if the other 
option was estimated to generate the better consequence. We can find an example for it from the 
citation about the kind Anala in the first chapter. Here, the king is illustrated to deceive his 
people in order to lead them to practice Buddhist precepts well. In general, deceiving others is 
considered one of the five grave sins like killing others in Buddhist schools. However, Goodman 
interprets that some precepts can be violated for the purpose of earning the better consequence. Is 
this interpretation really plausible? Is it acceptable that someone who has perfect wisdom and 
character can commit the grave sins in order to achieve the bigger benefit? Admittedly, these 
questions are quite difficult to simply answer. At the very least, however, it seems that such an 
interpretation is not commonly accepted in Buddhist schools. Buddha or Bodhisattva is not just 
an impartial spectator whom consequentialists have always requested. In addition, it is an 
oxymoron to indicate the eligibility to harm others with the words of perfect or pure. So I am 
sure that most Buddhists would have negative answers to these questions.  
It is really difficult to imagine Buddhist ideal figure who harms other sentient beings 
somehow. Buddhist precepts are what are required for every Buddhists to observe. Observing 
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them is generally regarded as not only the foundation of their faith in the teaching, but also the 
sign of qualification for being a Buddhist. So they are what should not be violated. The five ways 
of practice in the Awakening are also considered similarly and it is actually not very difficult to 
find such consideration in other treatises. It seems that expositions about karma theory which 
frequently appear in those treatises supports the consideration. This theory emphasizes that a 
practitioner must receive results corresponding to the violation of the precepts. Hence, the 
consequentialist interpretations that maintain that a Buddha or Bodhisattva can kill60 or deceive 
others for the purpose of earning better results are inappropriate understandings of Buddhism. 
Such a sin will not be justified because the karmic retribution must follow. Thus, these 
interpretations are unusual and radical understandings which depend on some selective reading 
of treatises. In order to plausibly generalize their interpretation, consequentialists need to provide 
wholistic explanations with more literary support, starting with analyzing the meta-ethical issues 
such as what is the ideal wisdom and character in Buddhism. 
 If we accept that the precepts should be always observed, they refute consequentialist 
interpretations. This is because they fundamentally rule out the possibility of choosing one 
among possible actions, making the quantifiable comparison and calculation of actions pointless. 
Instead, the moral evaluation of actions is supposed to be based on the rightness or goodness 
inherent in those actions, not based on their expected consequences. The five ways of practice in 
the Awakening are the kinds of the precepts that share this logic of the moral evaluation. 
Especially since they explain what practitioners should observe, and at the same time, would 
 
60 For example, Barbra Clayton argues that a Bodhisattva can be justified in killing others in order to prevent them 
from committing a grave sin. Cf. Barbra R. Clayton, “Śāntideva, Virtue, and Consequentialism,” edited by John 
Powers, in Destroying Mara Forever: Buddhist Ethics Essays in Honor of Damien Keown, NY: Snow lion 
publications, 2009, 23.   
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naturally observe, because practitioners are permeated by the pure functions of Suchness. That is, 
the five ways of practice have their own inherent moral rightness or goodness, which can be 
penetrated by the pure functions of Suchness, so they are constituents of a fixed set of practices 
that should be always followed. It is clearly different from consequentialist interpretation in 
which a moral values of an action vary based on its expected consequence. Committing sin by 
violating the precepts is never justified here for any reason.  
 For the ethical structure of the Awakening, the first thing we need to consider is the 
metaphysical nature of Suchness. As discussed above, Suchness, as a fundamental ontological 
ground for the ethical theory, takes a role of enabling sentient beings to raise faith and conduct 
actual practices. It is the powerful innate cause which leads practitioners to recover the original 
ontological state of it. That is, Suchness is the start, but at the same time, the end of the ethical 
theory of the treatise. Suchness is what subsumes every important ethical aspect within a single 
coherent system. Therefore, this ontological ground and the ethical theory of the Awakening 
cannot be considered separately.  
 Given these innate functions of Suchness, raising faith of the truth in the mind and 
achieving enlightenment must be considered to be the results caused by being of Suchness itself. 
Here, the two different types of practices, cessation and observation practice and the other four 
practices, are harmoniously united into a single theoretical structure based on the ontological 
ground. The fifth one was explained to be workable only after the faith of truth is sufficiently 
accomplished by the other four practices.61 So it still seemingly looks like that these two types of 
practices have different purposes and functions. However, now we can say that all of them are 
 
61 Asvaghosa emphasize the importance of raising faith as a condition to head toward awakening. Cf. 馬鳴, 大乘起信論, 
"信得增長, 乃能志求無上之道", T32, 580c. 
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actually the results from same Suchness. That is, they are the different parts of the process of 
being purified and changing to the right way (淨緣起). This means that every practice that raises 
faith, observes the truth and is awakened are merely the results of Suchness even though they are 
seemingly explained to be the separate things. 
  Therefore, it is clear that the ethical structure in the Awakening is quite different from 
the inner logic of consequentialism, which prioritizes beneficial consequences over evaluating if 
they ended up being moral ones. In this treatise, the agent can naturally know what he ought to 
do by the functions of Suchness, and his practice must generate goodness for himself and others 
just as a result. The practice of good deeds in this ethical structure, therefore, is a kind of natural 
consequence. This may be a reason why Asvaghosa sometimes uses the expression of "natural" 
(自然) in the treatise.62 Conducting practices as a result of being permeated by Suchness is 
naturally so, as he described above, it is called completing the dharma of nature (自然業). He 
explains the this expression "natural" means that there is no intention (作意).63 Hence, sentient 
beings are supposed to head toward awakening just as they inherently are.  
 Additionally, Suchness functions as a fundamental principle of the moral norms and its 
role does not change. In a long-term perspective, therefore, practitioners are supposed to 
necessarily head toward the right way. Because they are permanently permeated by the 
functions, they will comply with this principle somehow in the future. However, it does not mean 
that being of Suchness is the sufficient condition of awakening in itself. There is still room for 
the practitioner to voluntarily decide whether he seeks awakening or not. As described in the 
 
62 Ibid., "唯依法力自然修行, 熏習真如, 滅無明故.", T32, 579a. 
63 Ibid., "諸佛如來法身平等遍一切處, 無有作意故. 而說自然.", T32, 581c. 
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treatise, the mind of a sentient being is deluded from the very beginning of its being. Thus, the 
practitioner may not be able to achieve awakening if he does not willfully try to comply with the 
permeation of Suchness, and thereby try to remove the delusion. Of course, Suchness will 
positively affect them as an inner and outer causes, but sentient being still can decide if he will 
follow that or not. 
 Given the relation between Suchness, the fundamental principle, and the practices, it 
seems that the type of ethical structure the Awakening outlines is close to a deontology based on 
metaphysics. Moral deeds are to be conducted because beings are fundamentally affected by the 
ultimate principle, not because they desire to earn a certain benefit. According to the treatise, 
such desire is explained to be generated by the pure functions of Suchness. In addition to that, 
Suchness enables sentient beings to discern which deeds are morally good by guaranteeing the 
inherent pure wisdom of it. Therefore, moral rightness or goodness of deeds does not change 
according to their consequences. Rather, those deeds, including Buddhist precepts, are right or 
good in themselves. And it comes to be known to practitioners who achieved the pure wisdom of 
Suchness. 
 This type of ethical structure seems to remind us of classic deontological theories like 
Kantian ethics. Strictly speaking, however, it does not completely coincide with such Western 
deontology. Rather, it may be a stricter type of deontology in terms of the important notions that 
constitute the potential possibility of awakening, such as the moral motivation, good will, and 
intention of actions, which are also explained to be immediately provided by the principle.  
 Another significant difference between the ethical theory of the Awakening and classic 
deontology is that the former integrates an emotional aspect, which is called the great 
compassion, as an important constituent within its system. Kant, on the other hand, assured that 
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altruistic emotions must be ruled out from the norms for moral evaluation because he thought 
that emotions are random by nature, so they cannot necessarily cause right actions in a coherent 
way.64 However, the great compassion is considered to be necessarily felt when a practitioner 
realizes the truth by the wisdom of Suchness. That is, this emotional aspect has a necessary 
relationship with the ultimate ground, so it can function as a moral motivation of performing 
good deeds at all time. In sum, in the Awakening, moral deeds are properly conducted as a result 
of the combination of rational apprehension and emotional motivation, and this process is based 
on the ultimate ground of Suchness.65 This characteristic distinguishes the ethical theory of the 
Awakening from the existing deontological traditions or consequentialism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 Immanuel Kant (2002), Critique of Practical Reason, translated by Werner S. Pluhar, Hackett Publishing 
Company, p.38. 
65 Jinsub Song, "A Study on the Stereotyped Formality of the Ethical Theory of Mahayana Buddhism", Journal of 
Philosophical Ideas Vol. 46, Institute of Philosophy of Seoul National University, 2012, 19~20. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The ethical structure of the Awakening, which cannot be separated from its ontological 
ground, is quite different from the basic structure of the consequentialist perspective. However, 
the consequentialists failed to incorporate this ontological ground into their interpretations. 
Therefore, approaching to this treatise with such perspective is improper. Rather, the ethical 
structure of this treatise is closer to the strict version of deontology. The moral motivation and 
actual ways of practice are just provided from the metaphysical principle, which is called 
Suchness, and these factors are related one another naturally. The practitioner in this structure is 
just assumed to practice what he should do following the perfect wisdom and the good influence 
from Suchness.  
 The Awakening is not very rich in content. Thus, the ethical structure that I derived from 
this treatise may not represent Chinese Buddhist ethics. However, it is true that the idea of 
tathāgata-garbha within the Awakening has been shared by many Chinese Buddhist schools. 
Given that, this paper can be the starting point for studying the entire picture of Chinese 
Buddhist ethics.  
 This paper concentrated on the ontological aspect of the Awakening in order to refute the 
possibility of the false approach, that is, consequentialism. However, an epistemological aspect is 
also important in studying the ethical structure of this treatise. In the Awakening, Suchness is not 
only the ontological ground, but also the epistemological ground. Thus, the ethical structure of 
this treatise can be fully grasped by incorporating these two aspects into a single theoretical 
system. This task will be a next research subject that we should pay attention to.  
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